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"Policy" in Judicial Decisions*
Albert Tate, Jr.**
Upon entering practice the lawyer is usually confronted with
a mass of routine matters and of litigation involving chiefly
application of settled principles to disputed facts. Thus meeting
comparatively few situations where policy as such plays an im-
portant consideration in the handling of their cases, many prac-
tical practitioners tend to regard rather contemptuously the in-
fluence upon judicial decisions ascribed to "policy" by law pro-
fessors. ("Policy" considerations I define for purposes of this
paper as those based upon social or practical or equitable reasons
why a court should decide a present controversy in a given man-
ner; as contrasted with purely "legal" or logomachical argu-
ments based upon the wording of a statute or the holding of a
precedent and reasoning therefrom.)
But the courts, and particularly the appellate courts, receive
the borderline cases of many law practices. Although a great
preponderance of an appellate judge's caseload - perhaps 90 or
95% or more - similarly involves routine application of prece-
dent and word-logic,' fairly soon in the life of the new judge
the moment comes when he realizes that there are some cases in
which he (or no one) can find "the" law - that is, legislative
enactments or sufficiently related decisions by his own or other
courts that definitely indicate which of two contrary reasonable
positions should have favorable judgment upon the facts found
to be correct. It is then for this new judge an interesting experi-
ence to have policy arguments re-emerge as a factor in the reso-
lution of some legal controversies.
Suppose, for instance, he finds that his own court or the re-
ported decisions of the other courts of his state have never con-
sidered the question now before him, but that in other jurisdic-
tions the various lines of jurisprudence provide two or more
opposing but equally logical resolutions of the issue. What
*This article is the substance of a talk given in May 1958 at the annual Law
Review-Moot Court banquet of the LSU Law School.
**Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
1. In his noted article, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HABv. L. REv. 940,
941 (1923), Dean Pound stated that the "bulk" of appellate cases merely "repeat
or ring insignificant changes upon familiar states of fact."
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should the judge do then? Should he follow the decisions of the
states closest to him? Of the greater number of states? Does he
flip a coin? Should he count the number of cases or of pages in
the opposing briefs, and decide in favor of the party with the
more numerous citations or pages? Should he instead rest his
decision on some apt excerpt from some decision, even though
in the context of its own facts it is completely inappropriate to
the present legal question?
No. I think he properly should decide on the basis of what
is best for the community as a precedent and of what impresses
him as the fair solution of the question for the parties con-
cerned: that is, on the basis of policy considerations.
The case of Sanders v. Sanders2 may illustrate the use of
policy in the decisional process, in the absence of guiding prece-
dent.
In this suit the interests of two brothers were opposed. The
assets of their deceased mother's succession, namely the proceeds
from the sale of the family home, were to be distributed. The
defendant brother sought to have recognized as a debt of his
mother's succession, to be paid before division of the net pro-
ceeds among the co-heirs, his claim for reimbursement of the
$313 advanced by him to have their mother buried after her
death in 1950. The plaintiff brother opposed payment of these
funeral expenses on the ground that such claim, first judicially
asserted in the 1954 succession and partition proceedings, had
prescribed; having been judicially demanded more than three
years after the debt was incurred.
While under our Civil Code open accounts ordinarily pre-
scribe in three years (Civil Code Article 3538), other code pro-
visions maintain funeral expenses as a highly privileged charge
upon the assets of the estate payable even before many of the
debts contracted by the deceased person himself (Civil Code Ar-
ticles 3191, 3252,. 3254). The legislature has not provided that
prescription does or does not run against such a charge upon the
estate; nor prior to the Sanders decision had the question ever
been considered in any published Louisiana opinion.
We felt there was much logic to the position of both parties.
Perhaps there was no reason why funeral expenses along with
other accounts should not prescribe in three years. On the other
2. 85 So.2d 61 (La. App. 1955).
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hand, funeral debts are a charge upon the assets of the estate;
maintaining these assets undivided could be considered a con-
tinuing recognition of the existence of the privileged debts im-
pregnating these assets. Funeral charges might thereby be dis-
tinguishable from ordinary open accounts. Or perhaps the right
to compel the coheirs to pay such privileged funeral expenses
from the assets of the estate prior to its division was a personal
action to which no prescription applied except that set forth by
Civil Code Article 3544: "In general, all personal actions, except
those enumerated, are prescribed by ten years." Thus, relying
upon logical reasoning alone we could not with satisfying cer-
tainty conclude that the result urged by either of the two oppos-
ing parties was necessarily preferable or correct.
Insofar as the equities of the case were concerned, I think
that almost everybody can agree that judgment should be in
favor of the heir who paid the parent's funeral expenses with
the expectation that such would be reimbursed when the parent's
estate was liquidated; and against the coheir who wished to re-
ceive a share of his mother's assets without contributing to the
cost of her burial.
But were we to hold that a coheir's right of reimbursement
was prescribed only by ten years' inaction, unfortunate social
consequences might ensue. This privilege for funeral expenses
need not be recorded to be effective (Civil Code Article 3276),
and a holding that this unrecorded privilege was effective
against property for ten years might in the future cause compli-
cations in the sale of property,3 as well as injustice to purchasers
acquiring several years later (perhaps through intervening con-
veyances) with the not unreasonable expectation that any co-
heirs in the chain of title had paid for the burial of their own
immediate ancestor.
Ultimately, we concluded that not only the equities of the
present case but also the needs of the community at large were
better to be served by a holding that funeral expenses did not
prescribe while remaining as a legal charge against the assets
of an undivided estate (although recognizing that the coheirs or
other persons might be estopped to claim them where a third
party purchaser was prejudiced by an unreasonable delay in
3. Every time the sale of succession property appeared during the last ten
years of a chain of title, the intending purchaser might be forced to ascertain
independently whether the funeral expenses were fully paid.
[Vol. XX
"POLICY" IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
asserting or recording the privilege). Within the usual behavior
of the community, coheirs often maintain an estate's property
in indivision and await the final liquidation of the estate for
final settlement of their mutual accounts with regard thereto.
We felt that it would be unwise as a guide to future behavior to
require a coheir or other who had expended money for funeral
expenses to file a suit against or to force a partition of the estate
within three years when there are often sound reasons to delay
final settlement until later (such as in the Sanders case, where
the family home was maintained unsold for four years after the
mother's death and until her aged husband also died, in order to
provide a shelter for him until his death).
We therefore held that the defendant coheir was entitled to
reimbursement of the funeral expenses.
We had the duty to decide whether or not the defendant
should receive his $313. The statutes and precedents did not
provide any determinative answer to this question, which had
to be answered "Yes" or "No" by us. In the absence of definitive
guide by the legislature or of prior judicial decision, an attempt
to decide the question without considering the equities and the
practical social implications of our decision would in my opinion
have been as irrational as deciding by a throw of the dice. Legal
rules and procedures are designed to aid human societies obtain
justice, not to exist as abstract theory independent of human
beings and social considerations.
Now the report of the Sanders case does not take more than
one page, nor (for reasons of brevity) does it explicitly treat of
the policy considerations that we weighed and that motivated
the final decision of what was an open question with two oppos-
ing logical answers suggested by the statutes. But I think it
illustrates how the courts must sometimes use policy as the most
rational basis upon which to select from the conflicting statutes
or precedents the rule which will (they hope) provide the wisest
and most just decision.
As Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court recently
observed: "We should not be misled by the clich6 that policy is
a matter for the legislature and not for the courts. There is al-
ways an area not covered by legislation in which the courts must
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revise old rules or formulate new ones, and in that process policy
is often an appropriate and even a basic consideration."'4
Even in an area regulated in detail by legislation, policy may
be a factor in the court's decisional process; although the policy
ascertained and applied may be that which is deemed to have
been the legislature's, rather than the court's, conception of the
wisest rule.
For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission5 the state
regulatory agency had refused to permit the insurance company
to charge new policyholders an initial membership fee in addi-
tion to what was denoted as the policy premium. This non-recur-
ring initial charge was termed by the company an integral and
necessary part of a plan to afford the public a 25% reduction in
insurance rates by eliminating from the general rate formula the
annually recurring item of 25% "production costs" (mainly,
agents' renewal commissions). The state commission charged
that the company's plan deceptively labelled what was really part
of the cost of affording coverage (i.e., the premium) as a "mem-
bership fee."
The company and the commission relied upon apparently con-
flicting provisions of our Insurance Code.' As the company
pointed out, the legislature explicitly stated that nothing in the
Insurance Code "shall be construed to prohibit any insurer...
from charging in addition to the premium, a separate initial
membership, policy or inspection fee or other similar charge."' 7
(Emphasis added.) But, as the commission argued, other pro-
visions defined the premium or premium rate regulated by the
commission to include such membership fees exacted as part of
the consideration furnished for the purchase of the insurance
coverage.8
Argued both explicitly and implicitly were policy considera-
tions as to the merits of the company's plan: low cost insurance
by eliminating the middleman, the local insurance agency;
versus, the danger to the public weal by the destruction of such
local small-business enterprises and by the monopolistic concen-
4. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24
U. CH. L. REV. 211, 219 (1957).
5. 79 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1955).
6. LA. R.S. tit. 22 (1950).
7. Id. 22:1404(5).
8. Id. 22:5(7), 1404(6).
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tration of the insurance industry into a few such gigantic eco-
nomic aggregates as the insurer concerned, which might be able
to freeze out smaller insurers unable to compete with what were
in effect alleged to be temporarily lower rates subsidized by
profits made elsewhere from enormous concentrations of capital.
However, we found that such policy arguments were beyond
the scope of the court's consideration; for, as the company cor-
rectly argued, by the provision upon which it relied the legisla-
ture had explicitly stated that the Insurance Code did not (as
argued by the commission, in citing other provisions thereof)
prohibit approval of a membership plan such as the company
proposed, the only type known to the insurance industry. The
legislature having spoken, it was not for the courts to consider
the wisdom of the enactment.
But although the company argued that this legislative per-
mission likewise sanctioned in toto their plan as proposed, the
provisions of the Insurance Code relied upon by the commission
demonstrated to our court a general legislative policy that for
such purposes as rate regulation, reserve requirements (based
upon a percentage of premiums collected), gross premium taxes,
and (most pertinently to the litigation) quoting a price to the
public, such membership fees should be considered part of the
premium exacted for affording coverage, rather than a charge
in addition thereto. Accordingly, we sustained the refusal of the
commission to sanction the plan as proposed, which had treated
the membership fee as a charge additional to the premium.9 The
use of the legislative policy expressed by the statute determined
what we felt to be the correct among the permissible meanings
reflected by the statutory words.
But, it seems to me, policy plays a more general role in judi-
cial decisions than that so far described. Policy, in the sense of
the motivating equitable and practical reasons behind the deVel-
opment of legal principles, plays a constant although usually im-
perceptible role in the decisional process. Policy, in the sense
that justice is the aim and intent of all legal system and proce-
dures, is the spirit vitalizing the letters of the law.
9. We sustained the commission's rejection of the plan as proposed, but with-
out prejudice to the company's resubmission of a single initial membership fee plan
which showed as premium the entire consideration charged to the policyholder
for coverage. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Rat. Comm'n, 79
So.2d 888, 897 (La. App. 1955).
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The thrust of the judicial process is twofold: to obtain case
by case the fairest possible solution for the litigants in each in-
dividual case; and also to provide and follow just, sensible, and
predictable general rules. As a noted scholar and former jurist
has stated, "In a developed legal system when a judge decides a
cause he seeks, first, to attain justice in that particular cause,
and second, to attain it in accordance with law-that is, on
grounds and by a process prescribed in or provided by law."'1
The judicial decision of a legal controversy has been said to
involve (1) the selection of the legal materials, that is, "finding
the law"; (2) the development of the grounds of decision, that
is, the interpretation of these legal materials; and (3) the appli-
cation of the abstract ground of the decision to the facts of the
present case." When discretion may or must be exercised by the
judge in the selection, development, and application of the legal
materials, the judge will naturally tend to exercise what discre-
tion is afforded him in favor of the result deemed by him to be
more just or socially sound. Since the choice of legal materials
found applicable may dictate the result, the judge in such in-
stances will in the mental process of formulating his decision
tend to choose its legal rationale by working backward from the
just result, rather than by commencing from a legal premise and
finding out, by Jove!, that it leads to a just result.
At the risk of superfluity, it should again be emphasized at
this point that in the great bulk of cases any appellate court in
the same jurisdiction will reach the same conclusion. Either
both the rule of law and its application are certain; or, where
the factual application of the settled legal rule is what is contest-
ed, under principles regulating the weight given to factual de-
terminations of trial courts most appellate judges would simi-
larly affirm or reverse.' 2 The judges do not and should not dis-
pense justice simply according to their individual notions of
what is fair for the individuals concerned, or of what will in the
future provide a sensible rule for the community. The justice
they attempt to render must be accomplished within the frame-
work of their judicial system and subject to the discipline of the
judicial craft, which permits discretionary judicial choice only in
the absence of legislative policy or of prior binding precedent or
of a clear answer to the present litigation deduced either from
10. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1923).
11. Ibid.
12. See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164-65 (1921).
(Vol. XX
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legislative provisions or prior precedent or both.13 These obser-
vations concerning policy considerations as a factor in judicial
decisions should be read as subject to such qualification.1 4
In those comparatively rare instances where fairness or so-
cial utility are the touchstone of decision more than statute or
prior decision, it is in the last analysis the deciding judges them-
selves who determine the justness of the result or the soundness
of the rule. But they do so as representative voices of their gen-
eration. Individualistic and non-representative views of any par-
ticipating judges as to what should constitute a fair legal dis-
position with relation to a given set of facts tend to be brought
into conformity with the general social and moral feelings of
the times by the availability of appellate review (sometimes in
several layers) and by the practice of having multi-judge appel-
late tribunals. And whatever part policy may play in the de-
cisional process, the final product as expressed by the rendered
opinion must use normal legal reasoning; for unlike the mistakes
of physicians which according to the popular saying are buried,
those of appellate judges are published and perpetuated and, if
unsound, soon fall prey to higher courts or the critical pens of
the law reviews or both.
The importance of policy as a continuing factor in the judi-
cial process can perhaps more easily be evaluated retrospectively
than demonstrated in practice. To understand why the law
through the reported cases developed in a given rather than an-
other direction over the decades must often involve consideration
of the prevalent forces, thoughts, and feelings which are then
seen to have influenced the direction of the law along with that
of the society of which the law was but one expression.
An illustration that comes readily to the mind of a Louisiana
lawyer is the development of our mineral law. In the absence of
guidance from the legislature, the judiciary was forced on a case
by case basis to choose from the ancient concepts of our Civil
Code those deemed to afford the most suitable and just regula-
tion of private rights in mineral interests.
13. See, e.g., ibid.; Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAv. L. REV.
940 (1923) (passim).
14. As Cardozo observed, there is a danger that a "sketch of the judicial process
which concerns itself almost exclusively with the creative or dynamic element, is
likely to give a false impression, an overcolored picture, of uncertainty in the law




The judicial characterization of the mineral interest per se as
a servitude, as a right to go upon the land and search for oil, and
hence prescriptible by ten years' non-user (rather than as a non-
prescriptible ownership of subsurface property) ; and of the min-
eral royalty right as a real right running with the land, its con-
tinued existence conditioned upon the production of minerals
within ten years (rather than as an imprescriptible rental
charge imposed by the landowner to become operative only if
mineral development take place) ; cannot be explained on the
basis of legal history or of logomachical reasons.15 The deter-
mining and unifying principles behind the judicial choice from
among contending available code concepts are found in policy
considerations: the belief that the community interest is better
served by legal concepts which favor landowner (and hence more
local) over absentee ownership of our mineral resources,16 and
which foster present development of minerals rather than the
holding of mineral interests undeveloped as a long-term finan-
cial investment.
Likewise, these motivating policy considerations explain the
subsequent judicial development of the mineral jurisprudence.
Following Frost-Johnson Lumber Company v. Saling's Heirs17
(which is generally regarded as the decision finally establishing
the non-ownership theory in Louisiana mineral law), one could
not have predicted nor can one explain the development of our
mineral law in terms of the previous application of the code con-
cepts utilized.'8 During the development of the jurisprudence
results were sometimes reached which appeared inconsistent
with the word-reasoning of earlier decisions.1 : But viewed from
the standpoint of the underlying policy reasons, the development
of the mineral law was (in retrospect) fairly consistent and pre-
dictable; and eventually most verbal inconsistencies in the rea-
soning were rationalized and harmonized consonant with the
policy-predicated results.
The social reasons which cause certain legal concepts or re-
15. DAGOETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA, chs. 1, II, VI (rev. ed. 1949).
16. As Professor Daggett stated, under other theories "small holders partic-
ularly may be unprotected and led by economic stress to dispose of their most
valuable possession forever for relatively small suns." Id. at 267.
17. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
18. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGuTS IN LOUISIANA 41 (rev. ed. 1949) ! The
courts "fitted the applicable articles of the Code, discarding those in which the
letter would have been against public policy and inimical to the protection of
private rights."
19. See id. at vhs. IT, VI.
[Vol. XX
"POLICY" IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
sults to seem logical and just in the minds of the judges may not
be articulated. The comparatively recent emergence of the doc-
trine of contributory negligence has, for instance, been explained
as an incidence of and aid to industrial development in the last
century, 20 although it is likely that few nineteenth century judges
recognized that the perceived utility and assumed fairness of
the doctrine resulted more from the social climate than from his-
torical precedent. Again, a recent brilliant study of "proximate
cause" has attempted to demonstrate that the judicial use of this
concept to limit or expand liability is often explained as much
by unexpressed policy considerations as by reasons of logic.
2
'
Even in deciding so routine a type of litigation as intersec-
tional collisions, a certain amount of policy choice is made by
the courts. The legislature has provided that under certain cir-
cumstances one vehicle has the right of way over other vehicles
to proceed into an intersection; but there are also legislative pro-
visions and other standards of reasonable care regarding look-
out, speed, and control which have weight in the determination
of whether one or all the drivers involved in an intersectional
collision are guilty of or free of negligence or contributory neg-
ligence.
In the view of some courts and expressed by some decisions,
both drivers are at fault whenever an intersectional collision
occurs because the accident would not have occurred had either
driver observed the other approaching the intersection. Al-
though such a view is certainly not illogical, in recent years our
court has consistently rejected such reasoning22 but has instead
(with what we hope to be at least equal logic) given great weight
in deciding intersectional collision damage suits to the legisla-
tive rule in favor of the driver with the right of way in accord-
ance with what it feels to be the legislative intention and the
ordinary behaviour of reasonably prudent drivers.-
20. See, for instance, Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,
41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1956), which also discusses the social cross-currents affect-
ing developments of the doctrine. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
1197-99, § 22.1 (1956).
21. Comment, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 391
(1956).
22. See, e.g., Janice v. Whitley, 111 So.2d 852, 855 (La. App. 1959). This
decision cites many of the recent right of way cases rendered by the Court of
Appeal, First Circuit.
23. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 83 So.2d 667,
669 (1955) : "In the everyday world, ordinarily prudent motorists on the main
thoroughfare do not slow before each corner and attempt to peer down the side-
streets, but instead concentrate most of their attention on the path ahead, relying
19591
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This, I submit, is a not uncommon illustration of the neces-
sity of a court at various stages of its history to choose, from
among competing rules which may with equal validity be held
applicable, that general rule which will provide what the court
hopes will be the fairest and wisest disposition of the present and
future controversies arising out of the same or similar be-
haviour. Having made the choice (or having had the choice
made for it by a higher tribunal), the perceptive court will apply
the rule not by rote but in the light of the rule's underlying rea-
sons in policy. In this sense, these policy reasons play a part in
the decision of even routine cases, even though the court does
not establish or reconsider the basic policy reasons behind legal
principles thus applied by it.
A recent appeal decided by our court may perhaps be regard-
ed as one of those rare instances where the justice-dictated re-
sult (or, if you will, the policy-dictated result) influenced the
choice of the legal theory upon which the case was decided. In
Standard Motor Car Company v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Company,2 4 a garageman sued to recover damages
caused to his customer's car while it was entrusted to the garage-
man for repairs. Although the pleadings were broader, the gar-
ageman's cause of action and right to bring the suit for such
damages was argued and resisted before us solely upon the ques-
tion of whether he was subrogated to his customer's cause of
action against the tortfeasor (the defendant's insured) for the
tort-caused damage to the customer's vehicle.
The garageman had simply paid for the damages and re-
turned the automobile to his customer without securing a con-
ventional subrogation. His counsel relied upon the provision of
Civil Code Article 2161 that: "Subrogation takes place of right:
.... For the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for
on their legal 'right of way'. Legislative provisions for right of way are to facili-
tate the passage of traffic in this congested twentieth century world. If to accom-
plish this purpose, and in realization that even observing the path ahead may
tax the ordinary motorists' powers of sustained observation, the legislature has
relieved the motorist on the right of way street of a duty ordinarily to slow before
each intersection (and, consequently, of a duty to take his attention from the
path ahead by darting glances each way down the intersecting streets)' appellate
courts should not supply artificial standards in an unrealistic attempt to allocate
damages after an accident has occurred." A majority of our Supreme Court is
apparently in accord with the view that right of way motorists may reasonably
rely upon their right of way in proceeding into intersections. Steele v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 235 La. 564, 105 So.2d 222 (1958) ; Ryan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22
La. 831, 95 So.2d 328 (1957).
24. 97 So.2d 435 (La. App. 1957).
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others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharg-
ing it." (Emphasis added.) However, a depositary such as the
garageman is under no duty to repair damages caused solely (ac-
cording to the allegations of the petition) by the negligence of
another, the defendant's insured. 25 Therefore, the defendant
argued with apparent justification, no legal subrogation under
the code article took place in favor of the plaintiff, who was not
bound "with" or "for" the defendant's insured to repair the
damages caused by the latter's negligence. Accordingly, the gar-
ageman's suit must (it was argued) be dismissed, since no con-
ventional subrogation to the customer's cause of action had been
secured by the garageman at the time he paid the damages.
26
The court was dissatisfied with the result thus reached. As
the garageman's counsel argued, the garageman was under at
least a moral duty to repair his customer's vehicle before return-
ing it, and it seemed unfair and against the ordinary sense of
justice of the community to deny the garageman recovery for
the repairs for which he had paid and to permit the tortfeasor
upon such grounds to escape liability for these damages admit-
tedly caused by his own negligence, when he had no essential
concern as to the ownership of the automobile with which he
had collided.
Since the garageman in a practical sense had an "interest"
in repairing his customer's car if he wished to retain his custom-
er's trade and to avoid a bad business reputation, research in the
French sources of our code article was undertaken to determine
whether legal subrogation was intended to occur in circum-
stances such as the present. The learned legal scholar whom we
consulted informed us that such was not the case; but he imme-
diately added that under the French equivalent of Civil Code
Article 213427 concerning the discharge of obligations and the
jurisprudence thereunder, the payment of another's debt by "a
third person no way concerned in it" entitled the latter to reim-
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2945 (1870) : "The depositary is only bound to restore
the thing in the state in which it is at the moment of restitution. Deteriorations
not effected by an act of his, are to the loss of the depositor."
26. See, e.g., Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93
So.2d 228 (1957) ; Soileau v. Gibbs, 229 La. 976, 87 So.2d 312 (1956).
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2134 (1870): "An obligation may be discharged by
any person no way concerned in it, such as a coobligor or a surety.
"The obligation may even be discharged by a third person no way concerned
in it, provided that person act in the name and for the discharge of the debtor,




bursement from the true debtor even though the third person is
not subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor.2 8
Therefore the garageman who had discharged the tortfeasor's
debt was entitled to be reimbursed by the latter, even though not
subrogated to his customer's cause of action against him.
Furthermore, once we were freed of the notion that we were
concerned solely with a subrogation problem, independent re-
search by our court discovered Louisiana jurisprudence to the
effect that possessors such as depositaries have standing to sue
and recover from tortfeasors damages caused by the latter, ir-
respective of the possessors' non-ownership of the property dam-
aged.2 9 Also' recovery was probably allowable under the civilian
theory of negotiorum gestio.30
Now it may well be argued that what this description of our
process of decision in this case represents is a deficiency in
initial research upon the part of counsel and the court, not the
application of policy to the decision of the controversy. But to
me it is at least a rough illustration of a policy-predicated re-
sult influencing the legal characterizations to be applied to de-
cision of the case, as compared with applying legal characteriza-
tions to obtain the result. To apply the legal theory argued pro-
duced a manifestly unfair result. But, had we shrugged our
shoulders and decided the case on this theory without further
inquiry, our decision would have been not only inequitable, but
also bad law.
This case has also seemed to me another demonstration of
the principle that the thrust of the law has been and is always
toward justice. Ordinarily, legal rules are enacted or develop not
because of logic, but to serve needs of the community. The
underlying aim of legislator and judge is to provide a general
rule that upon specific application produces or permits results
consistent with the community's common sense notions of what
is fair and practical. When application of a rule produces an
individual result manifestly unfair and unsensible, the reason
may be not the unfairness of the law but its misapplication by
the practitioner or judge.
The fundamental purpose of all legal systems of Western
28. Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Mutual Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435, 438-39
(La. App. 1957).
29. Id. at 436-38.
30. Id. at 439-440.
[Vol. XX
1959] "POLICY" IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 75
civilization is to provide just determinations for the practical
disputes of mankind. This purpose is the yeast that vitalizes the
otherwise inert masses of legal theories and rules. To attempt
to understand or explain or apply law without reference to this
underlying consideration is to miss the essence of legal systems
and the judicial process. Although statutes and precedents are
indeed the body of the law, "policy"-or justice- is its soul.
And thus in my opinion the law professors are correct to ap-
preciate, and perhaps some practical practitioners wrong to dis-
count, policy considerations as influencing judicial decisions and
the judicial process.
